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Cigarette Litigation's Offspring:
Assessing Tort Issues Related to
Guns, Alcohol, & Other
Controversial Products In Light
of the Tobacco Wars
Gary T. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION
Let me begin by commenting on what I shall refer to as the structure of danger
with respect to tobacco, guns, and alcohol. Tobacco-mainly in the form of
cigarettes-provides undeniably significant benefits for consumers. Cigarettes, I am
told, improve one's concentration. Cigarettes, I also learn, have a very good taste.
In addition, cigarettes function simultaneously as an effective antidepressant and
an effective tranquilizer. To that extent, a cigarette is a kind of miracle drug that
one cannot otherwise acquire in the medical marketplace. It is available, moreover,
without going through the costly intervention of any physician.
Neyertheless, cigarettes kill more than 400,000 Americans per year. Those
who die are, in almost all instances, the immediate consumers of tobacco products.
They suffer death even though they use those products in altogether normal and
proper ways. To be sure, it can be argued plausibly that cigarette smokers make a
deliberate choice in deciding to smoke in the first place. Accordingly, whatever is
left of the tort defense of assumption of risk is relevant to whatever tort claims they
might bring. Even so, it would be difficult for a court to conclude that cigarette
smokers behave unreasonably in smoking cigarettes, and therefore are guilty of
contributory negligence. Actually, many of us are no doubt sanctimonious
nonsmokers, who might indeed be willing to say that smoking cigarettes is
unreasonable. Obviously, however, tobacco companies defending against lawsuits
are not in a position to argue that buying and using their products consists of an
*. William D. Warren Professor, UCLA School of Law. These introductory remarks were
originally prepared for purposes of oral presentation at Pepperdine's Symposium, Beyond Tobacco:
Cigarette Litigation's Offspring: Assessing Tort Issues Related to Guns, Alcohol, and other
Controversial Products in Light of the Tobacco Wars. Subsequently, the Law Review Editors have
asked to publish my remarks, and I have agreed to this. My footnoting is minimal.
unreasonable act on the part of smokers themselves. Therefore, in litigation against
those companies, the companies are in a position to invoke assumption of risk as
a possible affirmative defense; yet it would be awkward for them to argue
contributory or comparative negligence as a separate defense.
As far as guns are concerned, they provide very substantial benefits in terms
of both self-defense and recreational activities such as hunting. Nevertheless, guns
are responsible for many deaths and injuries each year. An important point is that
guns rarely kill or injure the consumers who themselves buy the gun products.
Rather, guns kill innocent third parties, who have in no way assumed the risk of
the dangers associated with guns. Even so, in general, guns produce these results
because of the careless or even willful misuse of the guns by those who have
purchased and own the guns. These misusers, then, are the principal tortfeasors
with respect to the injuries that guns produce. Nevertheless, these principal
tortfeasors are frequently not apprehended or identified. And even if they are
apprehended, they are frequently insolvent with respect to liability for the harms
their tortious conduct has caused. As far as the use of guns is concerned, an
obvious and pertinent point is that most gun owners use guns in normal and
appropriate ways. It is a limited, though clearly significant, fraction of all gun
owners who misuse guns either negligently or willfully in ways that impose serious
injuries on innocent third parties.
Turn now to alcohol. As properly used by most consumers, alcohol provides
plenty of recreational and relaxing benefits. Not only that, but alcohol in moderate
use evidently improves the health of those who drink and consume it. A beer a day
helps keep the doctor away. That is literally true. According to the recent medical
literature, one or two drinks per day of beer or wine appear to be associated with
significantly improved health outcomes. However, when alcohol is overutilized by
consumers, it can destroy the consumers' own health. Furthermore, if used by
consumers at improper times, alcohol can be highly productive of serious injuries.
There are 20,000 auto fatalities per year that are associated with drinking on the
part of the driver of one of the cars involved in the accident. Moreover, even
though most of the publicity has been focused on alcohol and drunk driving,
alcohol is an enormous contributor to serious accidents in all kinds of other ways.
Of all adult pedestrians who are killed in highway accidents, about 30 percent are
legally drunk at the time of the accidents themselves. Of all people killed by falling
down stairs and by drowning in bodies of water, roughly half are intoxicated at the
time of the fatal accidents. Hence alcohol is a background factor in a quite large
percentage of all fatal accidents. In all these ways, alcohol used improperly (or
used at improper times) is a disaster in terms of bringing about serious health
problems and personal injuries.
In sum, all three products-tobacco, guns, and alcohol-are quite dangerous.
Nevertheless, the structure of danger differs significantly from product to product.
Keep in mind, moreover, that modem products liability rules, as expansive as they
seemingly are, do not impose liability on dangerous products as such. Rather, they
impose liability on products that contain what the law refers to as defects.
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Consider automobiles. About 40,000 people die in auto crashes each year, and
several million more suffer personal injuries. The overall economic cost of auto
accidents is well over a hundred billion dollars per year. But even though
automobiles are enormously dangerous, there is no general or "wholesale" rule
making auto manufacturers automatically liable for all auto accidents that result.
Rather, lawsuits are brought against auto makers on a limited "retail" basis for
accidents that seem caused by particular defects in cars. When I gathered data on
all of this several years ago, my data indicated that automakers end up bearing
liability for only a tiny fraction of all auto accidents-a fraction much less than one
percent.
By now, we are quite familiar with the elements of the concept of defect within
products liability. Arguments for products liability might seem strong against
cigarette manufacturers: after all, their products produce injury even though they
are used by consumers in entirely normal ways. But despite this fact, it turns out
to be very hard to figure out where the defect lies in tobacco or in cigarettes.
Manufacturing defects simply are not much of an issue. A warning has been
provided on cigarette packages under federal law since the mid- 1960's. Moreover,
claims of failure to provide warnings in addition to those required by federal law
may well be legally preempted by the federal statute itself. As far as design defects
are concerned, proof of a design defect depends in large part on the demonstration
of a better alternative design. In the context of cigarettes, it is very difficult to
identify an alternative design that would reduce the danger of cigarettes without
significantly impairing the value they provide to cigarette smokers. The recent gun
cases, have raised allegations that guns could incorporate safety devices that might
be effective in somewhat reducing the accident rate. Yet, the overall desirability
of these safety devices seems quite controversial. Moreover, such safet5 devices
would be effective in eliminating only a limited fraction of all gun-related injuries.
Obviously, no safety device would prevent a bad person from using a handgun and
deliberately inflicting a gun wound in the course of committing a crime.
What has been genuinely novel about the tobacco cases in recent years, and
now the gun cases as well, is that suits have been brought not by injured victims
themselves but rather by public entities, state and local. What are these suits all
about? Of course, states incur health costs on account of Medicaid programs, and
cities incur health care costs on account of public hospitals. In addition, with
respect to the gun cases, cities absorb law-enforcement costs in tracing down the
consequences of gun-related crimes.
As far as health care is concerned, assume that the patients themselves--the
1. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem American
Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601,633 (1992).
immediate victims-have tort claims against tobacco companies or gun companies.
Assume further that they receive health care treatment from state and local
programs. It is possible, then, that these public entities can assert the claims of the
primary victims by way of subrogation. Subrogation either can exist under the
common law, or specific state statutes and perhaps local ordinances can provide for
it. However, the question with respect to subrogation-like claims is whether those
claims must proceed case-by-case, or whether the public entities can in some sense
aggregate individual claims and assert them in a mass-tort-like way.
Subrogation apart, public agencies obviously incur economic costs in
providing treatment to those who suffer disease on account of tobacco, or injuries
and disease on account of guns or alcohol. Given these economic costs, quite
without regard to subrogation, public entities possibly can bring direct suits against
manufacturers for having suffered economic losses on account of what might be
the tortious conduct of the manufacturers themselves. Here, however, the public
entities run into the general rule that in negligence law (and products liability as
well) there is no cause-of-action for the infliction of mere economic loss. To be
sure, there are a number of important exceptions to that general rule. In addition,
the general rule has itself been seemingly overturned by leading opinions in a
limited number of states; California happens to be one of those states. The
California opinion twenty years ago, J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,2 can plausibly be
read as creating a general cause of action for the negligent infliction of economic
loss.' Accordingly, in California the public entities' claims may be considerably
stronger than they would be in the majority of states.
Returning to the tobacco litigation, I can state that never has so much money
changed hands on account of lawsuits in which the legal theories have been so
uncertain-not wrong, but rather uncertain. The 1997 global settlement (which
ended up failing because of a lack of Congressional implementation) was for a sum
of money in excess of $300 billion. The subsequent 1998 settlement between
states and tobacco companies is for an amount considerably in excess of
$200 billion. The only commentaries I can find on the legal theories that underlie
the settlement are one article4 and one student comment,5 which both roughly favor
the states' legal theories, and an Alabama task force report, co-authored by a law
professor, which generally disapproves of those theories.6 There has been a
scattering of lower-court opinions, which have generally allowed cases to proceed
2. 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
3. See id. at 63.
4. See Raymond E. Gangarosa, Frank J. Vandall, & Brian W. Willis, Suits by Public Hospitals to
Recover Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and
Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81 (1994).
5. See Michael K. Mahoney, Comment, Coughing up the Cash: Should Medicaid Provide for
Independent State Recovery Against Third-Party Tortfeasors Such as the Tobacco Industry?, 24 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REF. 233 (1996).
6. See William H. Pryor Jr., et al., Report of the Task Force on Tobacco Litigation, 27 CUMB. L.
REV. 577 (1996-97). The law professor is Michael DeBow.
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on some theories, but have rejected other theories. The only state supreme court
ruling I am aware of is in Iowa; the Iowa Supreme Court basically threw out the
Iowa state case.7 The 1997 and 1998 settlements are really amazing in terms of
what they include. Settlement money, for example, goes to states like Kentucky
and Alabama that were not even parties to the suits--states that had refused to join
in the litigation efforts. Under the terms of the 1998 settlement, money is now
going from tobacco companies to tobacco farmers who will lose sales and revenue
on account of the settlement, but whose actual legal rights obviously have not been
violated by anything that the tobacco companies have done. The future annual
payments that tobacco companies will be making to the states may be adjusted
pursuant to a formula which allows the tobacco companies' payments to go down
if cigarette sales decline.
All of this gives states a very odd incentive to hope for an increase in tobacco
sales rather than a decrease. Consider, moreover, companies that might be new
entrants into the cigarette market and which might thereby take business away from
those existing companies who are bound by the expensive terms of the settlement;
how can those new companies be prevented from dramatically expanding their
sales? It turns out that the settlement contains terms specifying that tobacco
companies' payments to states will decline if the market share enjoyed by those
tobacco companies itself declines. Moreover, the settlement requires the states to
enact various measures that will make it expensive for new companies to gain entry
into state tobacco markets. This, then, is a settlement that obviously raises
questions about the violation of the competitive norms established by various
antitrust statutes.'
Given all the oddities in the settlement, one could possibly complain about
irresponsible appellate courts making bad law, and about irresponsible juries
coming in with inappropriate verdicts. But once again, there have in fact been no
state supreme court opinions that have endorsed the state claims. In addition, there
have been no jury verdicts in favor of those claims-though a jury was in fact
deliberating the Minnesota case at the time that this case was settled. However bad
the litigation results might possibly be, those results have been a matter of
voluntary settlements on the part of the tobacco industry. These are settlements
that are particularly surprising because until now tobacco companies have been
famous for hanging tough, for having out-prepared, outspent, and out-hustled
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) at every turn in the previous rounds of individual
litigation.
7. See State v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998).
8. See the overview provided in Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, THE TOBAcco DEAL,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTIvITY 323 (Martin N. Baily et al. eds., 1999).
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Why then this dramatic change in tobacco companies' litigation strategy? One
explanation focuses on the dynamics of the state suits. In those suits, the plaintiffs'
side was very well prepared and very well financed. A separate explanation is that
in these new state suits, the states were able to take advantage of internal company
documents suggesting the irresponsibility of the tobacco companies. A third
explanation is that tobacco companies had simply become weary of being charged
with corporate irresponsibility; they may have wanted, by entering into the
settlement, to declare that "we are now responsible corporate citizens rather than
corporate outlaws."
If, however, the latter has been the industry's strategy, my estimate is that this
strategy is failing or backfiring. The willingness of tobacco companies to pay $300
billion (or $200 billion) seems to have entailed a kind of public acknowledgment
by the companies of their own guilt and responsibility. This is a public acknowl-
edgment that makes those companies more vulnerable, rather than less vulnerable,
to other kinds of legal challenges. The companies' implicit acknowledgment of
their responsibility in the state settlement may well have contributed to the $51
million verdict in an individual smoker's claim in San Francisco just a couple
weeks ago.' This is a verdict which, including punitive damages, would have been
severely regulated by the 1997 settlement, but which is unaffected by anything in
the terms of the 1998 settlement.
Overall, as I consider the state suits, what I think we are seeing is a new kind
of legal proceeding. This proceeding entails, first of all, a shift from private law
to public law. Secondly, the proceedings seem less concerned with precise legal
theories, and more concerned with a kind of public melodrama. I am told that
before the state suits were filed, a meeting of state attorneys general was convened
by Mark Moore, the Attorney General of Mississippi. Those attorneys general
were inclined to ask, "What are the elements of the causes of action that we're
alleging here?" Attorney General Moore basically responded by saying, "Forget
the elements. Let me show you the internal company documents that will help
mobilize jury sentiment in favor of our cases." It seems clear that the public
perception of tobacco company misbehavior has played a very large role in the
companies' belief that these are cases they might well lose, and therefore should
be inclined to settle.
In comparing the tobacco litigation to the alcohol litigation and also the gun
litigation, one can easily say that it is the apparent misbehavior of tobacco
companies that enables the tobacco litigation to stand apart. Even the Wall Street
Journal editorialized a while ago to the effect that there should be a special place
in hell for tobacco company executives. (To be sure, the Journal went on to say
that there should also be a special place in hell for overly aggressive trial lawyers.)
9. See Myron Levin, Tobacco Firm Liable in Cancer Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at Al;
Joseph Menn & Myron Levin, Jury Awards $50 Million in Tobacco Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999,
at Al. The verdict was about $1 million in compensatory damages and then $50 million in punitive
damages.
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It is hard to identify a special place in hell for the executives of alcohol companies,
or for that matter auto makers, even though those companies' products entail a very
high injury rate. As for gun manufacturers, a year ago most of us would have been
inclined to say that their behavior has not been seriously problematic. On account
of litigation, however, we are now learning about possible instances of misbehav-
ior, including the adoption of marketing strategies that may be designed to
circumvent state regulatory efforts. We learn more about these strategies in Denise
Dunleavy's contribution to this symposium.
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